What are the “failed tunes” in the repertoire of the “piper” attempting to protect Israel? What can the countries who are “paying the piper” with military and financial resources do to achieve the best outcome in this conflict? The Economist Leaders column on Oct 8th 2023 focused on analysis of the policy that may have failed to prevent War in the Middle East.
Mr Netanyahu’s policy of sidelining the Palestinians depended on three calculations, each of which has been thrown up into the air by the Hamas assault.
The first is that, even if the Palestinian question was left to rot, Israelis could remain safe. As a result of the terrible casualties of the second intifada, which finished in 2005, Israel shut Palestinian populations away behind security walls. Superior intelligence and overwhelming firepower, including the Iron Dome anti-rocket system, meant that the armed threat from Palestinian fighters was manageable.
That notion now looks broken. One reason the intelligence services may have been distracted from Gaza is that the West Bank has been thrown into disarray by the expansionist aims of Israel’s far right. In southern Lebanon Hizbullah has a fearsome arsenal, much of it supplied by Iran. No doubt, Israel will be able to re-establish its military dominance over the Palestinians. But even if its soldiers and spies believe that this ensures Israeli citizens are protected, voters themselves are unlikely to conclude that a return to the status quo is good enough. (The Lessons From Hamas's Assault on Israel, 2023)
The second assumption was that the existence of Hamas helps Israel deal with Fatah, the Palestinian party that runs the West Bank.
It was assumed that divide-and-rule kept the Palestinians weak and that the influence of radical factions would undermine the credibility of moderates as partners for peace—all of which suited Mr Netanyahu just fine.
With these attacks, that notion has also run its course. One reason for Hamas to strike was that divide-and-rule has created the conditions in which Fatah has become decadent and out of touch; its leader, Mahmoud Abbas, is ailing. With this assault, Hamas is claiming to be the true voice of Palestinian resistance. Inter-Palestinian rivalry was supposed to protect Israelis; it has ended up making them targets. (The Lessons From Hamas's Assault on Israel, 2023)
The third assumption was that Israel could strengthen its position in the Middle East by pursuing regional diplomacy even as it left the Palestinians to fester.
That view was endorsed by the signing of the Abraham Accords between Bahrain, Israel and the United Arab Emirates in 2020—and the addition of Morocco and Sudan later. Until this weekend, it had looked as if Saudi Arabia might join, too. Eventually, it still may, but Hamas has shown that the Palestinians have a say, too. (The Lessons From Hamas's Assault on Israel, 2023)
An article in the Middle East and Africa section of the Economist on Oct 22nd 2023 commented that every Israeli war is fought watching the clock, as international condemnation grows and eventually America qualifies its support.
In 1973 America urged a ceasefire ending the Yom Kippur War despite Israeli forces being on the advance. In 2006, it imposed a ceasefire before Israel could achieve its objectives in Lebanon. As one Israeli official puts it, “our window of international legitimacy is limited.” That usually points towards using maximum force to inflict punitive damage and re-establish deterrence fast before the window closes. This time may be different.
Israel’s stated aim is expansive: to destroy Hamas’s capabilities and remove it from power. That means laboriously clearing a 500km labyrinth of tunnels and house-to-house fighting. One general involved says “to completely eliminate Hamas’ capabilities to launch rockets you must eliminate the rocket operators”, who often fire from civilian buildings. In 2016-17 it took Iraq, with help from a coalition, nine months to destroy Daesh in Mosul, a city of 2m people before it was occupied. (The Lessons From Hamas's Assault on Israel, 2023)
The best way to try to extend Israel’s “window of legitimacy” with its Western and Arab allies would be to signal that it is prepared to participate in some kind of plan for the Palestinians if it succeeds in removing Hamas.
On October 21st Mr Biden tweeted “we cannot give up on a two-state solution”. Gaza would need a credible Palestinian administration, with the backing of Arab nations, in order to rebuild and ensure Hamas does not return. Here Mr Netanyahu, who is fighting for his political survival, is doing his country no favours by denying, as he did on October 21st, that the preferred long-term solution for Gaza is to re-establish the control of the Palestinian Authority (pa), which rules in the West Bank and has condemned the Hamas attacks. Mr Netanyahu is the architect of the two-decade strategy of ignoring and isolating the Palestinians, and dividing them between Hamas-ruled Gaza and the West Bank run by a weakened pa. That failed approach is one of the reasons Israel is about to go to war against Hamas. Israel’s lack of a plan for the Palestinians could also now compromise its ability to sustain a long campaign. (Israel's Window of Legitimacy in Gaza Is Shrinking, 2023)
The NATO countries, especially the United States who are “Paying the Piper” and should be “Calling the Tune” need to more seriously begin “Assessing the Piper’s tune” and directing the “Piper” to realistic and humanitarian strategies to eliminate Hamas and return the hostages.
References
Israel's window of legitimacy in Gaza is shrinking. (2023, October 22). The Economist. Retrieved October 27, 2023, from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/10/22/israels-window-of-legitimacy-in-gaza-is-shrinking
The lessons from Hamas's assault on Israel. (2023, October 8). The Economist. Retrieved October 28, 2023, from https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/10/08/the-lessons-from-hamass-assault-on-israel
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